"SKEPTICISM ABOUT PERSONS"
John Doris (Washington University -St. Louis, Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology)
Thursday, Feb 5 at 4:00 at Mergenthaler 366
Doris is a leading figure in empirically informed moral psychology. He
is the author of _Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior_ and the
forthcoming _A Natural History of the Self_. Much of Doris' work has explored the
upshot of results in social psychology for moral philosophy. For more info,
visit:
http://moralpsychology.net/jdoris/
IMPORTANT: Though Doris will kick things off, much
of this event will be discussion based on a pre-circulated paper (attached), as
per usual with the Seminar on the History of Political and Moral Thought which
is co-sponsoring this event.
In lieu of an abstract, here are the paper's
opening remarks:
"Suppose
you're given a puzzle, and asked to construct grammatical sentences out of
randomly ordered words. The version you get is laced with terms related
to stereotypes of the elderly, such as old, grey, wrinkle, and Florida, while other folks get a
version where the geriatric vocabulary is replaced with age-neutral words such
as thirsty, clean, and private. Afterwards, as you
make your way to the elevator, you walk more slowly than your pals in the
neutral condition (Bargh et al. 1996: 236-7). Weird, huh? One thing to walk slowly because
your feet are killing you, or the cherry blossoms are blooming,
or you want to strike up a conversation with that cute boy from the coffee
shop. But to walk more slowly because you've just read
about Florida? Evidently, your mind -- or pieces of mind – does
stuff on its own, without your supervision. What if such shenanigans are
common? Turns out, this may be the case, and if so, there's reason to
doubt the prospects for human agency, which means there's reason to fear
skepticism about persons. I think this skepticism can be ameliorated, but
I won't undertake this ambitious project here. At present, I've a
relatively humble aspiration: showing that the ambitious project would indeed
be ambitious. In other words, I mean to persuade you that the skeptical
challenge needs to be taken seriously. To conclude, I'll suggest
something further: answering the challenge will require substantial departure
from entrenched commitments in philosophical ethics and moral psychology."